Consequently, after observing that cancer rates rose with estimated accident doses, they concluded that this association might be evidence of stress among the exposed, rather than the effect of radiation from the TMI accident (5), which was their primary hypothesis. In contrast, we considered the possibility that exposures for some populations may have been substantially higher than the 1 mSv assumed by Hatch et al. (3) and that evidence of an observed association could lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of no accident effect on cancer incidence.
Hatch et al. should be familiar with reasons for questioning the assumption that the maximum dose received from the TMI accident was 1 mSV. Contrary to their statement that cytogenetic damage was the "sole supporting evidence" that led us to consider the possibility of high doses (1), the document they cited (6) in their article (3) , as well as proceedings from the TMI Public Health Fund (7), report conditions that would be expected following high radiation doses, including hair loss, vomiting, nausea, animal deaths, and excess cancers. Further, models used to estimate exposure were based on inadequate data because of inoperable radiation monitors, sparse placement of dosimeters, and unavailability of detailed meteorological data for the study areas. Radiation monitoring data were particularly inadquate for releases that occurred early in the accident.
Hatch et al.'s contention that "there were no court-imposed limitations on our exposure models" seems to conflict with their statement that "the only limitation involved our agreement to use an exposure model rather than upper limit dose calculations, which are not suitable for an epidemiological study in the first place" (1) . They do not note that the court order did permit them to assume "upper limit or worst case estimates of releases of radioactivity" if this scenario resulted in an estimate of "less than 0.01 health effects," and they fail to mention that the order further required approval of their findings by nuclear industry attorneys (8) . Under most circumstances, a worst case scenario would appear to be an unreasonable assumption for a scientific study in which best estimates would be used rather than extremes in either direction. However, there is extensive evidence that the industry and government agencies responsible for the operation of the TMI plant, reporting of releases, and protection of the public, have a long history of showing greater concern for public image than for full disclosure of occupational and environmental radiation exposures and evidence of radiation health effects (9-13).
Hatch et al. (1) write that they "considered but rejected a post-versus pre-accident analysis." This statement conflicts with the Methods section of their paper in which such an approach is described and with a result (for lung cancer) that they say was based on that strategy (3) . Their argument that the plant was operational in the pre-accident period has no bearing on this analytical strategy, as concern about routine emissions would only provide further rationale for considering adjustment for baseline differences in cancer rates.
The (14) .
Although the total population size in the TMI 10-mile area was given in our paper (2) , and the size of populations in the four dose categories created by Hatch et al. were given in their paper (3), we did not include the population size in each of the nine dose groups shown in our Table 3 (2). This 
